

EMERGENCY ANIMAL DISEASE/ANIMALS IN DISASTER

**Illinois Hazard Specific Annex
Illinois Emergency Operations Plan**

And

Illinois FMD Procedures

EMERGENCY ANIMAL DISEASE/ANIMALS IN DISASTER

Hazard Specific Annex Illinois Emergency Operations Plan

PRIMARY AGENCY:

State: Illinois Department of Agriculture (IDOA)

SUPPORT AGENCIES:

State: Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA)
Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)
Illinois Department of Transportation - Highways (IDOT-H)
Illinois Department of Transportation - Aeronautics (IDOT-A)
Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH)
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA)
Illinois State Police (ISP)
Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR)
Illinois Department of Military Affairs (IDMA)
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
Illinois Department of Central Management
Services (CMS)
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS)
Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC)
Department of Human Services (DHS)
Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM)
University of Illinois (Uof I)
American Red Cross (ARC)

Federal: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Veterinary Services
Farm Service Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

OTHER SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS:

Illinois State Veterinary Medical Assoc. (ISVMA)
American Veterinary Medical Assoc. (AVMA)
Illinois Beef Association
Illinois Pork Producers Assoc.
National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP)
Illinois Horse Council
Illinois Milk Producers Assoc.
Illinois Farm Bureau
Illinois Coalition for Animal Agriculture

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose

The purpose of this Annex is to coordinate the initial, as well as ongoing, response of State and federal agencies, and private organizations and entities in response to and recovery from an outbreak of an emergency animal disease or other animal related disaster (EAD/AD). In as much as some EAD=s are zoonotic, this coordination may also involve the identification and control of diseases of public health significance. Issues of major concern in preparedness and response to an EAD/AD outbreak or disaster include: prevention of introduction, disease surveillance, rapid identification, initiation of steps to reduce the further spread of the disease, and disposal of infected, exposed, and dead animals during an outbreak, provide for adequate housing and care of animals displaced during a disaster.

B. Scope

This Annex provides technical advice and assistance to state, county and local governments, professional animal health organizations, and industry during an EAD/AD. The Annex includes procedures for the identification, containment, and elimination of an EAD as well as a response to a natural disaster. This Annex is applicable to all federal and State agencies identified in the Primary and Supporting Government Agency outline. It is anticipated that the remainder of the other Supporting Organizations identified in this Annex will participate to the fullest extent possible.

II. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation

1. Several serious animal disease outbreaks have occurred outside the United States recently. Foot and Mouth Disease in Taiwan's swine population in 1997 resulted in the slaughter of more than five million hogs. The recent Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera) epidemics in the United Kingdom, Mexico, and the Netherlands have resulted in the slaughter of more than 10 million hogs. Ongoing problems with this disease in Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic continue to be a threat to the U.S. swine industry. The occurrence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Great Britain has resulted in a large number of beef and dairy cattle destroyed and the disease continues to be identified. The importation of animal products from foreign countries, the ease of travel throughout the world, the lifting of restrictions on animal health movement as a result of Free Trade Agreements, and the presence of international airports underscore Illinois' vulnerability to an outbreak of an EAD.
2. Although concerns about animal diseases are increasing, the public gives it little attention. Protecting animal agriculture in the United States requires cooperation, participation and partnership. While the USDA has assumed leadership in combating the EAD problem, they do not have the resources nor the desire to assume these responsibilities alone. Consideration must be given to the fact that an outbreak of an EAD within the State of Illinois could be devastating to the economy. The State/local response is the first line of defense in an animal health disaster, the quality of which likely will determine the final economic impact to the State.

3. Natural and man-made disasters have been occurring with increasing frequency worldwide. With the advent of large animal production facilities and an ever-increasing pet population, the need for a disaster response plan is imperative. Local response to a disaster is limited and federal response will be secondary or non-existent.

B. Assumptions

1. Livestock producers likely will be the first to notice an unusual condition/disease in their animals. The concerned producer should make contact with one of four entities: 1) local private accredited veterinarian, 2) IDOA (State Veterinarian, field veterinarian, or livestock investigator), 3) the Illinois Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories or 4) the USDA/ APHIS, VS (Area Veterinarian-In-Charge (AVIC), Field veterinarian, or livestock field investigator).

If the disease situation is unexpected with high death loss, or if the symptoms are unusual, and especially if an EAD is suspected, a private accredited veterinarian must report immediately his or her findings to the State Veterinarian and/or USDA-AVIC.

2. When notified, the State Veterinarian, or the USDA-AVIC, will in turn contact the other person to determine what steps, if any, are necessary to further characterize the disease occurrence. This may include the dispatching of a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to the location, and requesting assistance from the USDA Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (USDA-READEO) Early Response Team (USDA-ERT).

If the FADD determines that the differential diagnosis includes an EAD, the USDA-AVIC will notify IEMA, USDA-Emergency Programs and other appropriate federal government officials. The FADD will obtain a Foreign Animal Disease Investigation case number from the USDA-AVIC. In addition, the USDA-AVIC and

State Veterinarian, depending on the likelihood of an EAD, will take steps to isolate the disease to as small an area as possible. This may necessitate the involvement of local, county, and State law enforcement agencies to assist in securing the area.

3. If the suspected disease has potential wildlife impacts, the State Veterinarian will contact IDNR, who in cooperation with IDOA, will determine the appropriate response to protect wildlife or conduct surveillance activities of wildlife to determine their disease status.
4. Suspected EAD's in or potentially affecting wildlife or fish will be reported to IDNR, who in turn will report this information to the State Veterinarian. If the disease has potential livestock impacts, IDOA will determine the appropriate response in cooperation with IDNR.
5. If the suspected disease has potential public health impacts, the State Veterinarian will contact IDPH. IDPH, in cooperation with IDOA, will determine the appropriate response to protect human health and welfare.
6. In the event of animals being displaced in a natural or man made disaster, the State Veterinarian, in cooperation with State and local authorities, will determine the appropriate response to protect animal health and welfare.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- A. In the event of an EAD or animal disaster, the State Veterinarian and/or USDA-AVIC, will contact IEMA and the Illinois Emergency Operations Plan (IEOP) will be implemented.

- B. The State Veterinarian and/or USDA-AVIC, along with IEMA will make the determination as to:
 - 1. When to request activation of a USDA-READEO
 - 2. Procedures necessary to isolate the affected area.
 - 3. When to activate the SEOC.
 - 4. The procedures to be utilized to combat the outbreak once it is identified as an EAD.
- C. IDOA will send a liaison to the SEOC when the SEOC is activated.
- D. IDOA and if possible, IDOA's other Supporting Organizations will activate and staff the IDOA Emergency Action Facility.
- E. Key functions to be performed in the event of an EAD/AD will include:
 - 1. Appraisal of fair market value of livestock and poultry involved in affected area.
 - 2. Biosecurity and surveillance to contain and prevent the spread of disease.
 - 3. Cleaning and disinfection (C&D) of infected premises after depopulation has been completed.
 - 4. Depopulation and disposal of infected and exposed animals, animal products, bedding and feedstuffs.
 - 5. Epidemiological investigations to determine the source and possible spread of the disease.
 - 6. Regulatory enforcement of quarantines.

7. Vaccination programs, if warranted to help control the spread of the disease.
8. Controlling vectors that may be involved in the spread of disease.
9. Provide shelter, food, water, and veterinary care to displaced animals.
10. Provide assistance in reuniting owners with their animals.

IV. STATE AGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Primary Agency

1. Illinois Department of Agriculture:
 - a. IDOA is the primary State agency for this Annex. As such, IDOA will function as the primary decision maker and co-decision maker with USDA-APHIS for the READEO, if activated, and function as the lead State agency when the READEO is activated.
 - b. IDOA issues quarantines, and oversees the implementation and enforcement of restricted or quarantined areas, with the assistance of the other State and federal supporting agencies. Because time is of the essence in an animal health emergency, quarantines may initially be issued verbally but will be documented in writing as soon as practical.

- c. IDOA determines the extent to which IDOA personnel will respond to an animal health emergency. Duties in support of this Annex will take priority over all other duties of IDOA.

B. Support Agencies

1. Illinois State Police:

- (a) ISP is the lead State Law Enforcement Agency for security in and around the impacted area.
- (b) ISP will restrict movement in and around the quarantine zone to prevent the movement of animals and animal related products in order to stop the spread of the disease.
- (c) ISP provides traffic and access control.

2. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency:

- (a) IEPA provides expertise regarding the disposal of contaminated animal carcasses, bedding, feedstuffs and equipment in a way that is environmentally sound and does not further the spread of disease.
- (b) IEPA provides expertise regarding the cleaning and disinfection of infected areas using environmentally sound procedures and chemicals.
- (c) IEPA expedites the process of obtaining necessary permits for the above.

3. Illinois Emergency Management Agency:
 - (a) IEMA determines the need for a Gubernatorial Proclamation of a Disaster Emergency.
 - (b) IEMA coordinates assistance from support agencies.
 - (c) IEMA activates the SEOC when determined necessary.
 - (d) IEMA coordinates supplemental federal assistance with FEMA.
 - (e) IEMA coordinates the procurement of communications equipment.

4. Illinois Department of Military Affairs:
 - (a) IDMA provides support to ISP for security in and around the impacted area.
 - (b) IDMA provides traffic and access control.
 - (c) IDMA provides emergency communications equipment and personnel.
 - (d) IDMA assists IDOA with euthanasia and proper disposal of infected animals.
 - (e) IDMA assists IDOA and other responding agencies with the transportation of necessary equipment, personnel, and livestock.
 - (f) IDMA assists IDOA with the decontamination of vehicles, equipment, and facilities.

- (g) IDMA provides aircraft and aircrews to conduct assessment and surveillance operations.
 - (h) IDMA provides heavy equipment, trucks, other vehicles and manpower for animal carcass removal and disposal.
5. Illinois Department of Transportation - Aeronautics:
- (a) IDOT-A provides aircraft and aircrews to conduct assessment and surveillance activities.
 - (b) IDOT-A provides air transportation for emergency workers and other key personnel, when required.
6. Illinois Department of Transportation - Highways:
- (a) IDOT coordinates with district offices, county and township commissioners to determine which roads, if any, could be closed around the periphery of the quarantined zones to aid in biosecurity and traffic control.
 - (b) IDOT provides personnel, heavy equipment, trucks and other vehicles for animal carcass removal and disposal.
 - (c) IDOT provides equipment and personnel to assist in vehicle decontamination.
 - (d) IDOT provides barricades and/or signs to be used in and around the quarantined zones.

7. Office of the State Fire Marshall:
 - (a) OSFM coordinates the use of local fire department personnel and equipment when requested.
 - (b) OSFM provides expertise in fire safety when burning is used for carcass and materials disposal.
 - (c) OSFM provides expertise on the use of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and other Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).

8. Illinois Department of Public Health:
 - (a) IDPH communicates with the local health departments, medical facilities and regulated entities in the event the EAD is zoonotic.
 - (b) IDPH upon being informed that a suspected EAD has been detected within the State of Illinois, determines public health risk and impact, if any.
 - (c) IDPH notifies the U.S. Centers for Disease Control that an outbreak of an EAD has occurred within the boundaries of the State of Illinois, inform them of the nature of the disease, its primary animal host, and if it is considered to be a health hazard to humans.
 - (d) IDPH assess and advise regarding the public health risk associated with burial or burning of dead and affected animals.
 - (e) IDPH assists with epidemiological investigations.

9. Illinois Department of Natural Resources:
- (a) IDNR provides technical advice on the risks to wildlife and methods to mitigate these risks.
 - (b) IDNR supports the law enforcement aspect of the restricted or quarantine area, if applicable. IDNR will make available specialized equipment and associated personnel (e.g. boats, snowmobiles, ATVs and four-wheel drive vehicles, as needed).
 - (c) IDNR, if the EAD is one that has a history of affecting wildlife, initiates a surveillance program in the immediate vicinity of the outbreak and determine if the disease has spread to wildlife. In addition, the IDNR will initiate steps to prevent the spread of the disease to susceptible wildlife.
 - (d) IDNR identifies the potential for the disease to be spread by wildlife (e.g., infected animals, scavengers, intermediate hosts) outside of the affected areas.
 - (e) IDNR identifies hunting seasons and wildlife associated within affected areas and makes recommendation on closing seasons and restricting access to public sites. IDNR will enforce these restrictions and enlist the assistance of other law enforcement agencies as necessary.
 - (f) IDNR expedites collecting permits for personnel and assists in collections as necessary.
 - (g) IDNR provides expertise and data showing geographical information on soils, surface water and ground water.

10. Illinois Department of Corrections:
 - (a) IDOC provides buses, vans, vehicles and any available staff to drive these vehicles.

11. Illinois Department of Central Management Services:
 - (a) CMS assists with the procurement of needed emergency supplies and equipment.
 - (b) CMS provides vehicles, fuel, repairs and service needed to carry out the emergency animal disease operation.
 - (c) CMS assists with purchasing and/or contracting telecommunications equipment.

12. Illinois Commerce Commission:
 - (a) ICC Transportation Division provides information and assistance in the Transportation Industry (highway and rail) under its jurisdiction in and around quarantined areas.
 - (b) The ICC Public Utility Division provides information regarding regulated water, gas, electric and telephone companies and services under its jurisdiction in and around quarantined areas.

13. Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety:
 - (a) IDNS provides expertise regarding the handling of contaminated substances.
 - (b) IDNS provides protective clothing and decontamination equipment for use in infected areas.

- (c) IDNS provides emergency communications equipment.

14. University of Illinois:

- (a) U of I makes cooperative extension personnel (livestock specialists), faculty and staff, along with students on a voluntary basis, available to assist in EAD control and eradication.
- (b) U of I provides a wide range of expertise from College of Agriculture Consumer and Environmental Science and College of Veterinary Medicine regarding EAD control and eradication.
- (c) U of I activities are coordinated by the Dean's of the College of Veterinary Medicine and the College of Agriculture Consumer and Environmental Science.

15. American Red Cross:

- (a) ARC will provide mass care services for those in the impacted area.
- (b) ARC will provide mental health services to those impacted, if required.

The duties of the above support agencies are not limited to those listed above. Other duties are identified throughout the various annexes of the IEOP.

2. Federal Agencies:

USDA, APHIS, VS Emergency Programs will assume a primary role for responding to an EAD within a few days of diagnosis. Initial response of the USDA will be through the USDA-READEO for the Eastern Region. This Appendix provides for response actions prior to the full involvement of USDA, and also provides a framework for supporting the USDA once they are fully engaged through their emergency response structure. USDA will use the State Veterinarian as the primary contact point for IDOA. The State Veterinarian will serve as the IDOA representative in the USDA response system.

3. Private Organizations:

Private organizations have a great deal of interest in a response plan of this type since their livelihood may depend upon the outcome. In most cases a private entity, such as a local veterinarian, will be the first “on scene” and must make immediate decisions. A local veterinarian, as a veterinarian accredited by the USDA, APHIS, VS and the State Veterinarian, has the authority to verbally restrict movement of animals suspected of being affected with an EAD. The local veterinarian is then required to immediately notify the State Veterinarian who, with the assistance of the USDA-AVIC, determine the next appropriate action(s) to confirm or rule-out the presence of an EAD, and to restrict animal and, if necessary, people movement in and through the affected area.

Private enterprises such producers, auction markets, slaughtering establishments, and renderers will be notified by IDOA when an animal disease emergency exists. They will be encouraged to actively participate as an “Other Supporting Organization” in an emergency response.

V.DIRECTION AND CONTROL

- A. The primary point of contact for activation of this Annex is the State Veterinarian. The State Veterinarian will notify IEMA of an EAD/D.
- B. When the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture declares an emergency or extraordinary emergency, the USDA-READEO can be fully activated with funding made available from the Commodity Credit Corporation for indemnity.
- C. If and when the EAD/D exceeds State and local capabilities, the Governor may request federal emergency or disaster assistance.
- D. Listed “Other Supporting Organizations”, local veterinarians, animal control agencies, and the Humane Society will participate in an emergency operation on a voluntary basis.

VI. REFERENCES

- 1. Illinois Emergency Animal Disease Response Plan
- 2. Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO) Manual
- 3. Illinois Diseased Animal Act
- 4. Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act

ILLINOIS FMD PROCEDURES

Guidelines for classifying declared areas

In the declaration of areas the following factors need to be taken into account:

- industries involved
- environmental factors
- livestock movement patterns
- processing options (livestock and products)
- natural vs. artificial barriers/boundaries
- nature of the outbreak
- livestock species involved
- feral animal involvement

Infected premises (IP)

A premises on which FMD or the virus is confirmed or presumed to exist. Total movement control is imposed and all susceptible animals slaughtered and disposed on site. (Initial case must be laboratory confirmed. Subsequent cases may be confirmed on clinical signs.)

Dangerous contact premises (DCP)

A premises containing susceptible animals, or infected or exposed products, which have been in direct or indirect contact with an IP or infected animals or products. Total movement control is imposed. For FMD, it would invariably mean destruction of all or some of the susceptible animals on the property.

Suspect premises (SP)

A premises containing suspect animals, which will be subjected to quarantine and intense surveillance until the status is resolved. If there is no evidence of infection, the premises would then revert to normal status.

An area of at least 3 mile radius, when bovine and/or ovine only are present and 6 mile radius when swine are present will be drawn initially around all IPs and DCPs. The boundaries must be modified as new information comes available. The actual distance in any one direction is determined by factors such as terrain, wind patterns, weather, livestock movement and concentrations and susceptible wild animal distribution and movement. Susceptible livestock, within this quarantine area, shall be inspected by a veterinarian on the following schedule:
Week 1-every other day
Week 2-two times

Weekly thereafter until area deemed free of FMD.

Control area (CA)

A CA of initially the whole State will be imposed. The purpose of the CA is to control movement of susceptible livestock for as long as is necessary to complete trace-back and epidemiological studies. Less stringent movement control and surveillance will apply. Once the limits of the disease have been confidently defined, the CA boundaries and movement restrictions may be reduced.

Quarantine and movement controls

Infected premises and dangerous contact premises

Suspect premises

Movement out of susceptible animals:

Prohibited. All susceptible animals on premises and contiguous premises to be slaughtered within 24 hours and properly disposed on site.

Prohibited. Subject to intense surveillance.

Movement in of susceptible animals:

Prohibited.

Allowed under permit (1). Subject to surveillance.

Movement out of milk: Prohibited.

Allowed under permit, subject to treatment (2).

Movement out of wool:

Prohibited.

Allowed under permit (3) or after quarantine removed.

Movement out of skins, hides:

Prohibited.

Allowed under permit (4) or after quarantine removed.

Movement out of carcasses, meats, offal, wastes from susceptible animals:

Prohibited. To be disposed on site.

Allowed under permit (5) or after quarantine removed.

<i>Movement out of semen, embryos:</i> Allowed under permit (6) in certain circumstances.	Allowed under permit (6) or after quarantine removed.
<i>Movement out of other animals:</i> Prohibited.	Allowed under permit (7).
<i>Movement in and out of people:</i> Allowed under permit (7).	Allowed under permit (7).
<i>Movement in and out of vehicles and equipment:</i> Allowed under permit (7).	Allowed under permit (7).
<i>Movement out of crops and grains:</i> Allowed under permit (8).	Allowed under permit (8).

Control area

Movement out of susceptible stock:
Prohibited, except under permit or to slaughter in contiguous CA. All out of state movement will initially be prohibited.

Movement in of susceptible stock:
Movement from free areas to a property or Slaughter plant is allowed under permit (1).

Movement within of susceptible stock:
Movement to a slaughter plant or farm (1) is allowed under permit.

Movement through of susceptible stock:
Allowed under permit (9).

Movement of milk:
Movement into or within the CA is allowed.
Movement out of the CA may be allowed under permit, preferably after treatment.

Movement of wool, skins, hides:

Movement into or within the CA is allowed.
Movement out of the CA may be allowed under permit, preferably after treatment.

Movement of carcasses, meats, offal, from susceptible animals, including field-shot game:
Movement into or within the CA is allowed.
Movement out of the CA may be allowed under permit (5).

Movement out of semen, embryos:
No restrictions.

Movement of other animals, people, equipment:
Allowed, subject to conditions (7).

Vehicles:
No restrictions.

Risk enterprises:
May continue to operate under permit.
(based upon surveillance)

Sales, shows etc:
Subject to State Veterinarian approval.

Notes:

(1) Permits for the movement of susceptible animals onto a SP or CA should be issued only in exceptional circumstances. Although such movements may pose no risk of spreading infection, compensation would be payable if these animals become infected. Stock must remain on the property for at least 21 days and be inspected before being moved again. Permits should be issued by an accredited veterinarian on a VS -127.

(2) Milk heated to 72°C for 15 seconds or 135°C for one second may be used for any purpose except for feeding (as whole milk, products, by-products or waste) to susceptible livestock.

Because such milk is unsuitable for cheese making, the manufacture of cheddar cheese will be permitted from milk heated to 72°C for 15 seconds, provided that such cheese will be stored for at least 90 days at a pH of not greater than 5.5. Milk may also be used for manufacture of acid casein, which is precipitated at a pH of less than 5.2. Appropriate filters should be fitted to the air exhaust of milk tankers operating in the CA.

(2a) Fresh milk may be transported to a designated dairy factory in dedicated tankers fitted with air-exhaust filters, for treatment as prescribed in (2). Tankers must undergo thorough decontamination off each farm.

(3) Movement of wool from IPs, DCPs and SPs, may be permitted after treatment, depending on when the animals were shorn or skinned in relation to the earliest likely onset of infection:

- *wool obtained before first infection* — store until cleaning and disinfection of premises is completed, then spray bales or skins with 2% caustic soda and allowed to dry;
- *wool obtained during period of infection* — spray bales with 2% caustic soda and allowed to dry, store at 18°C for at least 4 weeks and/or undertake industrial scouring; or
- *wool held off-property but identified by trace-back as having been obtained during period of infection* — identify, spray bales with 2% caustic soda and allowed to dry, store at 18°C for at least 4 weeks and/or undertake industrial scouring; spray neighboring bales with 2% caustic soda.

Other genetic material collected within the IPs, DCPs and SPs, should be held and only released if the animals and premises of origin remain free of FMD for 21 days after collection. If any doubt exists, the material should be disposed of.

(4) Movement of skins and hides from IPs, DCPs and SPs, may be permitted after treatment, depending on when the animals were skinned in relation to the earliest likely onset of infection:

- *skins and hides obtained before first infection* — store until cleaning and disinfection of premises completed, then spray skins with 2% caustic soda and allowed to dry;
- *skins and hides obtained during period of infection* — bury during cleaning of premises (do not burn);
- *skins and hides held off-property but identified by trace-back as having been obtained during period of infection* — identify, remove and bury; spray neighboring skins with 2% caustic soda.

Other genetic material collected within the IPs, DCPs and SPs, should be held and only released if the animals and premises of origin remain free of FMD for 21 days after collection. If any doubt exists, the material should be disposed of.

(5) Carcasses, meats, offal and wastes from susceptible animals, including field-shot game, may be moved from SPs or out of the CA provided that:

- the material is not brought into direct or indirect contact with susceptible animals;

- every precaution is taken to ensure that effluent, other fluids or aerosols do not leak out of the transport vehicle;
- the transport vehicle and containers are decontaminated under supervision between loads;
- before being released, the material is treated or processed in a manner which will destroy FMD virus or which will ensure it is not fed to susceptible animals;
- cross-contamination between treated/clean and infected material does not occur; and
- wastes are disposed of in an approved manner.

(6) Semen and embryos collected from susceptible animals on IPs and DCPs within 21 days preceding the first signs of FMD should be destroyed and disposed of on site. Genetic material handled at the same time and potentially cross-contaminated should also be destroyed. Material collected and stored before this time may be removed after decontamination has been completed and the outside surfaces of containers, vials and straws have been disinfected. Other genetic material collected within the IPs, DCPs and SPs, should be held and only released if the animals and premises of origin remain free of FMD for 21 days after collection. If any doubt exists, the material should be disposed of.

(7) Movement of people, other animals, vehicles and equipment off IPs, DCPs and SPs should be restricted and subject to strict quarantine and decontamination procedures to prevent mechanical spread of FMD virus. Straw beds or other approved medium with disinfectant should be placed at all entrances for vehicle traffic. Foot baths should be placed for foot traffic. Disinfection solution should be replaced daily. Quarantine signs should be placed in a highly visible location on all livestock premises. Dogs are to be confined or tied up. People not farm related may move without permit on a limited basis. Within the CA, less stringent control procedures may be required. **A permit must describe in detail the conditions of issue.**

(8) Crops and grains harvested from fields that were sprayed or treated with effluent from an infected premises within 21 days preceding the first signs of FMD must be disposed of on site by burial or plowing in. Otherwise, crops and grains may be removed from IPs and DCPs after the completion of decontamination. The top ten inches of grain or crop stored in open piles must be removed and disposed of on site, and the remainder sprayed with citric acid or formalin. The material must not be fed to or used as bedding or litter for susceptible animals. If any doubt exists, the material should be disposed of on site.

(9) Direct movement by road or rail may be allowed by permit, provided the origin and destination are both outside the IPs, DCPs, SPs and CA, and the stock are not unloaded within the CA. If transport is delayed within the CA, the stock should be regarded as suspect and their further movement carefully reassessed.